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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-06684) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 13, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 







 Pro se appellant Maximo Gomez Nacer appeals the District Court’s order 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order.  See Anselma 
Crossing, L.P. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 637 F.3d 238, 239 (3d Cir. 2011); Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).1  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Nacer initiated this action by filing a complaint in the District Court in which he 
purported to appeal a judgment in his state divorce case.  Nacer stated that he wished to 
“provide more resources for [his] wife and daughter,” D.C. dkt. #1 at pg. 1, and alleged 
that his income had been improperly suppressed due to a wide-ranging conspiracy against 
him.  Nacer sought $308 million in damages.   
 The District Court dismissed Nacer’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.2  The 
Court concluded that the complaint “fail[ed] to identify diversity amongst the parties or 
present a federal question,” and that the domestic relations doctrine barred the suit.  D.C. 
dkt. #4 at pg. 1.  Nacer filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  To the extent that Nacer contends 
that the New Jersey Superior Court harmed him by issuing the divorce decree, the claim 
                                              
1 We may affirm on any ground apparent in the record.  See, e.g., Hughes v. Long, 242 
F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
2 Because the District Court docketed Nacer’s complaint without requiring him to pay the 
filing fee, we conclude that the Court implicitly granted Nacer’s motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis.  See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (“When 
a complaint is accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, rather than by 
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is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  That doctrine deprives 
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff 
lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court 
judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).   
 While this doctrine is “narrow,” id. at 169, it encompasses at least some aspects of 
Nacer’s complaint.  The New Jersey Superior Court issued a judgment in Nacer’s divorce 
case; he argues that he was injured by this judgment; the divorce decree preceded the 
federal action; and he explicitly asked the District Court to overrule the state-court order.  
Accordingly, to the extent Nacer challenges the divorce decree, the claim is barred by the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See generally Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing, with 
approval, Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986), where the Fifth Circuit applied 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in similar circumstances).3 
                                                                                                                                                  
payment of a filing fee, the complaint is not docketed, and it is therefore not filed, until 
the motion has been granted.”). 
3 Likewise, to the extent that Nacer invokes diversity jurisdiction and seeks to set aside or 
modify his divorce decree, the domestic-relations doctrine bars his claim.  See Matusow 
v. Trans-Cnty. Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 Nacer also appears to raise a variety of civil-rights claims, which potentially could 
be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  However, these claims were properly dismissed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  See generally Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 
(1992).4   
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
                                              
4 We are satisfied that amendment to the complaint would be futile, and therefore 
conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without providing 
leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
